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Little is known about the factors affecting pastoralists’ livestock vaccination 
decisions. In this thesis, we use a novel survey-based dataset on pastoralists living in the 
Ruaha landscape in Tanzania, and employ several econometric approaches to identify the 
factors affecting pastoralists’ decision-making process about livestock vaccination when 
disease occurrence and severity, vaccination and healthcare access costs and other related 
variables are known. Results from binary choice models that account for excess zeros 
indicate that socially and economically active households are more likely to vaccinate 
their livestock. The results also identify positive marginal effects of illness incidence and 
having wage earners and in the household on vaccination decisions. The results from 
mixture models also find that these same variables significantly lower the pastoralist’s 
probability of not vaccinating their livestock. Most notably, increased vaccination cost 
significantly lowers the probability that pastoralists vaccinate any livestock, as well as the 
number of vaccinated livestock. These findings have important policy implications 
considering livestock health education, veterinary service infrastructure, and supply-side 
management. (JEL codes: D13, D83, Q12, Q13, R28). 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Livestock production plays a crucial role in meeting global nutritional needs, accounts for 
approximately 40 percent of agricultural GDP, and provides pathways out of poverty for 
more than one billion people whose livelihoods depend upon livestock directly or 
indirectly (McPeak et al. 2011; World Bank 2011). Livestock disease is a persistent 
problem in many developing countries, and Tanzania is not an exception (Perry and 
Sones 2009), with approximately 60 percent of family-owned livestock suffering from 
some type of preventable disease like bovine and caprine pleuropneumonia, brucellosis, 
or foot and mouth disease (Clifford et al. 2008; Covarrubias et al. 2012; Kivaria 2003). 
Livestock diseases affect pastoralist households through multiple pathways: they 
contribute to food and nutritional insecurity, loss of wealth and income, and, in the case 
of zoonotic diseases, can lead to an increased disease burden for humans. Pastoralist 
households, which rely heavily on livestock as a source of nutrition, store of wealth, and 
for cultural status (Coppolillo et al. 2009; Hesse and MacGregor 2006; Lybbert et al. 
2004), are particularly affected by livestock disease losses. 
 
The likelihood and severity of livestock diseases influence household livelihoods 
and the burden of losses is often high, especially for households in less developed rural 
settings where veterinary services are limited (Allport et al. 2005). Preventive measures 
like vaccination, commonly referred to as averting actions or decisions, can lower the 
expected loss to disease (Mclnerney 1996). Pastoralists’ averting decisions are based on 
risk preferences, but are likely also shaped by previous experience with disease infection 
and loss. Their decision mechanism is a complex issue, and likely depends on various 
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socio-economic and household behavioral factors. The literature on livestock keepers’ 
vaccination averting decisions is limited, especially for pastoralist households. In the 
context of high exposure to livestock diseases (World Bank 2011), we empirically 
analyze household survey data to identify the factors that likely affect pastoralist averting 
actions to decrease the likelihood of future disease losses.  
  
This thesis extends the literature on households’ averting decisions, incorporating 
information on households’ livestock disease experience through two related aspects. 
First, we use household survey data to examine the impacts of potential socio-economic 
and behavioral factors of pastoralists’ averting decisions for livestock diseases, i.e., 
vaccination. In particular, we empirically test two major hypotheses. We test the 
hypothesis that the vaccination decision and number of vaccinated livestock is positively 
influenced by prior disease experience, i.e., illness incidence and livestock death in the 
past twelve months. Another hypothesis relates to vaccination cost. We hypothesize that 
higher vaccination cost negatively influences the vaccination decision. Second, based on 
pre-survey qualitative observations and empirical findings, we conclude the thesis with a 
few policy suggestions on ways to address barriers to vaccination. 
 
Following traditional averting behavior frameworks such as Bontemps and 
Nauges (2016), we assume that a pastoralist will choose to vaccinate their livestock if the 
expected utility when vaccinating livestock is higher than the expected utility from not 
vaccinating. As this decision to vaccinate or not is a latent representation of the relative 
difference in utility, we use their binary vaccination decision to capture differences in 
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relative expected utility. The decision depends on a variety of economic, community, and 
behavioral variables. Therefore, in explaining the pastoralists’ averting behavior for 
livestock diseases, we need to consider the role of disease experience and socio-economic 
factors together with related social beliefs. We assume that the binary vaccination 
decision and resulting number of vaccinated livestock are associated with previous 
disease and loss, with the costs of vaccination and travel to access vaccination services, 
the household head’s age and education level, and family and herd size, among other 
variables. Additionally, we include a control variable for households’ social and 
economic activity with households with at least one cell phone, a wage earner, and a 
primary school-educated household head considered to be more socially and 
economically active . Another categorical control variable representing diversified 
sources of income is also included to identify the effect of wage income on vaccination 
decisions.  The empirical basis of the study is a household survey conducted in 2012 in 
Pawaga and Idodi divisions bordering Ruaha National Park and community wildlife 
management areas in Iringa region, Tanzania. We collected household-level data on 
livestock disease and vaccination and related household and community characteristics 
using a structured questionnaire to analyze factors influencing households’ averting 
decisions through descriptive and econometric analyses. 
  
We consider an averting decision model where pastoralists’ have a binary choice 
variable that includes the decision to vaccinate or not vaccinate. Maximum likelihood 
approaches, such as logit and probit estimators, are frequently used as the estimation 
strategy to examine binary averting decisions. In logistic regression, maximum likelihood 
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estimates can be biased when events are rare. As our binary decision variable consists of 
few positive actions, we consider three variants of the logistic model that account for rare 
events in the outcome variable. First, we consider an exact logistic regression model that 
is appropriate for small samples with dichotomous covariates, but excluded from final 
analysis as our sample size is considerably high for this estimation. Second, the King and 
Zeng (2001) bias correction method of logistic estimation is employed. Finally, we use 
the penalized maximum likelihood estimation procedure proposed by Firth (1993). While 
another class of estimators, known as zero-truncated procedures, exists that produces 
more robust estimates, we cannot implement this procedure as it is only suitable for large 
datasets (n≥2000) with zero-truncated data. 
 
We extend the analysis to estimate a count data model where the number of 
vaccinated livestock is considered as the outcome variable. Most households did not 
administer any vaccinations, and therefore had zero vaccinated livestock. This is due to 
the presence of both true and excess zeros. There is also a considerable gap between 
observed zeros (89.29%) and predicted zeros (30% using a Poisson analysis). Moreover, 
the distribution of non-zero counts (10.71%) shows dispersion with a possibility of over 
dispersion. In this case, both hurdle and zero-inflated models (with or without over 
dispersion) can explain the high occurrence of zeros in the outcome variable. The hurdle 
model assumes a two-step decision-making process and expects a positive number of 
vaccinated livestock if and only if the household decides to vaccinate. The reason behind 
this zero in the count outcome variable is structural and depends on the binary first-step 
vaccination decision. On the other hand, zero-inflated or zero-altered models assume that 
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some pastoralists either do not know about vaccination or do not have the financial ability 
to vaccinate, which inflates the number of ‘excess’ zeros.  Households that have 
vaccination knowledge and financial ability to vaccinate generate non-zero count values 
when they choose to vaccinate. Their counterparts are unable to vaccinate due to financial 
constraints and generate zero count values even though they may want to vaccinate their 
livestock. The latter leads to ‘true’ zeros. Therefore, we need to consider a few variants of 
the hurdle and zero-inflated models—for example negative binomial and Poisson—to 
explain true zeros and excess zeros with or without over dispersed count data 
simultaneously. We find that negative binomial-logit hurdle (NBLH) and zero-inflated 
negative binomial (ZINB) models are the most robust techniques to analyze the number 
of vaccinated livestock based on the Vuong (1989) test, Greene (2012) likelihood ratio 
test, and various information criteria. 
 
Descriptive analyses provide a summary overview of the livestock vaccination 
status of three ethnic groups who faced disease in their livestock herds and consequent 
livestock deaths in the twelve months prior to the survey (see table 2 for details). Even 
though 49.74 percent of pastoralist households have experienced livestock deaths, only 
10.71 percent vaccinated their livestock in the study areas. A higher percentage of the 
households experiencing livestock disease—compared to households not experiencing 
disease—vaccinated their livestock, which is uniform across the ethnic groups. A Pearson 
chi-square test confirms that the difference is not significant among the ethnic groups. 
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We compare and contrast the findings revealed from the maximum likelihood, 
hurdle and zero-inflated estimations. Results from zero-inflated models, which explain 
excess zeros based on household types, indicate that pastoralist households that are 
socially and economically active, have at least one wage earner , and that are far  from 
the nearest livestock extension officer are less likely than their counterparts to be in the 
excess zeros group. Additionally, households that experienced livestock illness are less 
likely to be in the excess zero group. Households facing higher vaccination costs, on the 
other hand, are more likely to be in the excess zero group. Both maximum likelihood and 
hurdle models estimate the binary choice of vaccination decision. Results indicate that 
households who are more socially and economically active and have wage earners are 
more likely decide to vaccinate their livestock. Pastoralists are more likely decide to 
vaccinate their livestock if the vaccination cost is low. We also find that higher per capita 
livestock negatively influences the vaccination decision, suggesting that the more 
livestock a household owns, the lower the probability that the household vaccinates their 
livestock. It seems a little bit surprising but not without plausible explanations. Given that 
pastoralists hold most of their wealth in their livestock, this finding may result from 
diminishing marginal utility of wealth or changing risk preferences. Pastoralists with 
more livestock have more options and can either sell or eat the animals at home to cope 
with the disease occurrence without significantly affecting the sustainability of their herd. 
The number of ill livestock in the past 12 months, wage earnings and vaccination cost 
also influence the number of vaccinated livestock positively. A household head older 
than 30 years of age vaccinated more livestock than their younger counterparts. 
Additionally, socially and economically active households have more vaccinated 
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livestock than those that are not. Households who experience more livestock deaths due 
to illness vaccinate fewer livestock. In most cases, we find similar results for separate 
data specifications in terms of ethnic groups, except Barabaig. Results from the hurdle 
and zero-inflated models using the pooled data reveal a similar pattern and magnitude. 
 
The rest of the thesis is as follows: Chapter 2 provides overview of pastoralism in 
Tanzania with a brief literature review. Chapter 3 explains the conceptual framework of 
pastoralists’ averting decision, and resulting output in view of livestock diseases 
experienced in the past twelve months. Chapter 4 explains the sampling and survey 
design for data collection and the econometric estimation strategies. Chapter 5 discusses 
the empirical results and discussions with robustness checks. In the last chapter of the 
thesis, we conclude with a few policy suggestions based on the major findings. 
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CHAPTER 2: OVERVIEW AND RELATED LITERATURE 
Pastoralism in Tanzania has a long tradition where more than 30% of the land is either 
pasture-friendly arid or semi-arid land (Fratkin 2001). Over the last few decades, many 
African pastoral systems have been transformed with increasing agriculture-based 
development policies, loss of pasture land, and the alteration of communal property 
system. Only a small portion are now actively oriented with pastoralism as their major 
economic activity. According to Sandford (2006), the future of pastoralism will be 
influenced by increasing human populations and decreasing livestock production as well 
as pastoralists’ adaptive capacity to respond to these challenges. In addition to trying to 
maintain their traditional occupation, pastoralists face a high burden of livestock diseases 
in this region, which may be increased by climate change (Gustafson et al. 2015). 
Pastoralists in this area have already experienced the devastating impact of disease on 
livestock herd production and health. Though traditional and modern preventive options, 
e.g. vaccination, are available in some areas that are not sufficient enough. Moreover, 
related socio-economic variables actively influence pastoralist’s decision making process. 
From this perspective, both policy analyst and pastoralist need to understand the socio-
economic and behavioral factors of averting decisions, i.e. livestock vaccination, to 
reveal potential policy implications of practices including livestock health education, 
veterinary service infrastructure, and supply-side management. 
 
Empirical exercises on household’s averting decisions in general and factors 
affect the decision making process, in particular, have a long tradition in economics, 
especially in risk perception, decision under uncertainty, and valuation. The potential 
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significance of this averting decisions to livestock vaccination has been well documented 
in the prior literature. Various theories have been put forward to explain the household’s 
decision to take averting action. First of all, large theoretical works on the averting 
behavioral model began with the notion that an individual agent tries to minimize the risk 
of loss due to a specific reason. The averting behavior model can estimate the value of 
preventing diseases considering any action or expenditures that individuals undertake to 
avoid any undesirable outcome, for example, livestock illness or death. In contrast, 
theories of the cost of illness consider only the value of cure from livestock diseases with 
various direct and indirect costs. Related works on averting action or cost incurred to 
avoid livestock disease risks has provided insights about the theoretical frameworks on 
this behavior (Alberini and Krupnick 2000; Bontemps and Nauges 2016; Cropper et al. 
2004; Guh et al. 2008; Mclnerney 1996). In addition, both ex-ante and ex-post measures 
are used where ex-ante estimates prospective costs and ex-post estimates costs of an 
action that have already happened. 
 
Secondly, there are numerous empirical contributions that investigate socio-
economic and demographic factors that affect the decision making process. Some of the 
studies analyzed impact of risk perception on averting decision models. Other studies 
employed actual risk components, e.g. intensity, severity, and exposure, to understand the 
averting decision. While some literature studies evaluate actual averting expenditure, 
measuring willingness to pay is commonly used. Recently, averting decision-type models 
explicitly consider a household’s beliefs and an individual’s behavioral factors to explain 
the cognitive side of the decision making process. These commonly include a 
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household’s beliefs on particular actions, or sometimes social learning. Some studies also 
estimate stated and revealed behavioral data to check the predictive validity of actual 
behavior.  
 
This thesis is also related to the literature on the ex-post analysis of behavioral 
risk analysis (Clemen and Winkler 1999; Goldstein et al. 2004). It is closely related to the 
studies on technology adoption in agriculture (Adesina and Zinnah 1993; Just and 
Zilberman 1988; Khanna, Khanna and Zilberman 1997), and benefit-cost analysis 
decision framework for disease management (Nas 1996; Shwiff et al. 2013). This thesis 
also contributes the growing literature on averting decision and expenditure models under 
risks (Bontemps and Nauges 2016; Bosch-Domènech and Silvestre 2010). Since 
vaccination decision considers socioeconomic and cognitive factors, our results also 
contribute to the role of averting expenditure and other behavioral factors in determining 
vaccination decision. 
 
The importance of ex-post analysis of averting decisions to reconcile the 
empirical evidence in the context of livestock diseases suggests two important 
components of pastoralists’ decision making processes and consequences. The first 
concerns the decision making process of a rural pastoralist household in Tanzania. 
Regarding our empirical exercise, first we focus on cases where actions are recorded as a 
discrete variable and the averting decision is a binary choice. The second concern is 
about the estimation process where we use ex-post disease information and averting 
expenditure information instead of ex-post willingness to pay data. In the study, the 
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pastoralist household, rather than an individual, is the unit of analysis in this averting 
decision model, where the household head with all active members would be responsible 
for livestock vaccination. The primary objective of this article is to use field-level survey 
data to understand determinants of averting behavior (vaccination). We then examine the 
influences of these same factors in determining the number of vaccinated livestock. 
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CHAPTER 3: A SIMPLE FRAMEWORK OF PASTORALISTS’ LIVESTOCK 
VACCINATION 
In the study area, most of the pastoralists have experienced disease-related livestock 
losses due to different types of diseases, for example, bovine and caprine 
pleuropneumonia, brucellosis, and foot and mouth disease in the past twelve months. For 
pastoralists in diverse areas of the world, livestock are an important source of food, 
wealth, and social status (Lybbert et al. 2004). Mdoe and Mnenwa (2007) and Ouma et 
al. (2006) also indicate that larger livestock herds bestow prestige upon households in 
Tanzania. Given the substantial benefits that households derive from livestock, livestock 
health is important for household wellbeing. In this view, vaccination is one way for 
pastoralists to safeguard their herd so that they can maintain their food supply (e.g., meat, 
milk), wealth, and social prestige (Chilonda and Van Huylenbroeck, 2001; Lybbert et al. 
2004). One option for livestock disease control involves vaccination to reduce the 
probability of infection and loss. We further assume that the pastoralists’ decision rule is 
based on maximizing their expected utility by using vaccination to minimize the expected 
loss due to disease (Wolf 2013). 
 
Maximization of expected utility compares two decisions: vaccinate, 𝑣, and not 
vaccinate, 𝑛𝑣. Consider a pastoralist who chooses to vaccinate if her expected utility of 
vaccinating, 𝐸𝑈𝑣, is higher than the expected utility of not vaccinating, (𝐸𝑈𝑛𝑣): 𝐸𝑈
∗ =
𝐸𝑈𝑣 − 𝐸𝑈𝑛𝑣 > 0, where the utility difference, 𝐸𝑈
∗, is a latent variable. As all attributes 
that affect preferences cannot be observed, we consider an observable component of 
utility, 𝑍𝑖 where 𝐸𝑈𝑖
∗ = 𝑍𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖. We assume 𝑍𝑖 is linear in the parameters,  𝑋𝑖𝛽. Thus 
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𝐸𝑈𝑣 = 𝑍𝑣 + 𝑒𝑣 = 𝑋𝑣𝛽 + 𝑒𝑣 and 𝐸𝑈𝑛𝑣 = 𝑍𝑛𝑣 + 𝑒𝑛𝑣 = 𝑋𝑛𝑣𝛽 + 𝑒𝑛𝑣, where 𝑋𝑖 is the 
observable component that affects the pastoralists’ averting (vaccination) decision, 𝐷𝑣. 
Rewriting the previous expected utility function as 𝐸𝑈∗ = 𝐸𝑈𝑣 − 𝐸𝑈𝑛𝑣 =
𝑋′(𝛽𝑣 − 𝛽𝑛𝑣) + (𝑒𝑣 − 𝑒𝑛𝑣), where 𝐸𝑈
∗ is not observed, but we can observe the averting 
decision. In this case, McFadden (1973) suggested the random utility function for 
separable decision analysis, which models a binary choice variable, where 𝐷𝑣 = 1 if the 
pastoralists vaccinate their livestock, or 𝐷𝑣 = 0 if not. This specification can be estimated 
through the following form: 
 
(1) 𝐷𝑣 = 𝑋
′𝛽 + 𝑒 
 
As the pastoralists’ vaccination decision is a sequential, two-stage process, after 
deciding to vaccinate or not to vaccinate, they decide how many livestock to 
vaccinate, 𝑉𝑙𝑠. Based on equation (1) we can write the following:  
 
(2) 𝑉𝑙𝑠 =
{
≥ 0 𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑣 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠 (𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑏𝑦 ′𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜
′𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡) 
= 0 𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑣 = 𝑁𝑜 (𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑏𝑦 ′𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜
′𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡)  
 
 
Pastoralists who are not concerned about vaccination decide not to vaccinate, with 
a number of vaccinated livestock always equal to zero. This type of pastoralist generates 
‘excess’ zeros. Other households desire to have positive numbers of vaccinated livestock, 
but some may have zeros due to several potential constraints, such as a lack of financial 
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ability to pay for vaccination; these observations are known as ‘true’ zeros. In this 
respect, modeling true and excess zeros is essential to explain all potential situations. 
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CHAPTER 4: DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Sampling and Survey Design 
The empirical basis of this thesis is a pastoralist household survey conducted in 2012 in 
Pawaga and Idodi divisions near Ruaha National Park and community wildlife 
management areas of Iringa region, Tanzania (Figure 2) as part of a larger, long-term 
study on pastoralist households (Gustafson et al. 2015). As the Iringa Rural district has a 
large population of pastoralists (NBS 2013) who face a considerable livestock disease 
threat to heard health and household livelihoods, we selected this area for a field survey 
to investigate the factors associated with livestock diseases and household vaccination 
decisions. A two-stage stratified random sampling approach was employed to select the 
pastoralist households from Pawaga and Idodi divisions. The sampling framework 
includes ‘village’ as a primary sampling unit, and ‘household’ as the ultimate sampling 
unit. We randomly selected 196 households from 21 villages to collect necessary 
information. 
 
A structured questionnaire was employed to collect pastoralists’ household 
information. We collected data on herd size, livestock vaccination status, herd-level 
morbidity and mortality data collected by livestock disease signs, and variables that 
influence the vaccination decision, e.g., vaccination cost, distance to livestock extension 
officer, and non-livestock sources of income. In addition, information related to 
household size and residents, and geographical and community characteristics were 
collected to assess the vaccination status of the study area. We grouped all the households 
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into three different strata based on ethnicity as a post-stratification procedure to capture 
any potential differences among the ethnicities. 
 
4.2 Estimation Strategy 
We use a two-stage estimation strategy to examine the factors affecting households’ 
decision-making processes and outcomes. We analyze the effects of socio-economic, 
behavioral, demographic and group variables on pastoralists’ binary averting decision 
and the number of livestock vaccinated. Finally, we employ various robustness checks to 
examine the consistency of the estimated results. 
 
According to equation (2), the decision variable is a binary output where 𝐷 = 1 if 
the 𝑖𝑡ℎ household vaccinates their livestock, and 𝐷 = 0 if they do not. This binary 
decision outcome can be modeled using various econometric estimations. Variants of 
maximum likelihood estimators (MLEs), such as the probit, are frequently used technique 
to model binary dependent variables. In addition, logistic regression, another variant of 
MLE is consistent, but only unbiased for large sample sizes; that is, estimates can be 
biased when sample size is small. Pre-estimation descriptive statistics on survey data 
reveals that 21 out of 196 (10.71% of total) respondents reported vaccinating livestock. 
As our binary decision variable consists of very few positive responses, we consider three 
different logistic approaches that account for rare events in the dependent variable. First, 
we consider an exact logistic regression model that is appropriate when the dependent 
variable is binary and sample size is small. As our sample size is around 200, and the 
number of degrees of freedom of the regression model is high, we don’t report these 
22 
 
results. Second, we employ King and Zeng’s (2001) bias correction method for logistic 
estimation, which incorporates the probability of rare events. Finally, we use the 
penalized maximum likelihood procedure proposed by Firth (1993) to reduce small-
sample bias in maximum likelihood estimation. Firth’s method is an alternative to the 
exact logistic regression method when there are rare events (Heinze and Schemper 2002). 
We also estimate the marginal effects of the covariate, which is the expected 
instantaneous rate of change in the outcome variable as a function of a marginal change 
in that covariate, holding all other covariates in the model constant. Then, we compare 
the marginal effects and related model fit statistics (see Table 4) of four MLEs of 
pastoralists’ averting decisions. We do not consider any variants of zero-truncated 
techniques because they predict zero counts even though there are no zeros in the 
outcome variable. Most notably, this estimation procedure is only recommended for large 
datasets. 
  
The second part of the econometric estimation examines the impacts of the same 
set of regressors on the number of vaccinated livestock as the second sequence of 
pastoralist’s averting decision making (vaccination). For this purpose, we consider the 
proportion of zeros in the outcome variable and the distribution of nonzero counts. Since 
the outcome variable has many zero observations, it may be that ‘true’ zeros—
pastoralists’ choices not to vaccinate made after weighing the costs and benefits of 
vaccinating—are conflated with ‘excess’ zeros, which reflect households that would 
never consider vaccinating. Preliminary descriptive statistics find a considerable over-
dispersion in the outcome variable where the variance of the number of vaccinated 
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livestock is quite high relative to its mean. Following Cameron and Trivedi (2009), we 
also test the null hypothesis of equidispersion through auxiliary regression, and find some 
evidence of overdispersion, though it is not statistically significant. There is also a 
considerable gap between observed zeros (89.29%) and predicted zeros (30%) through 
Poisson analysis. In this case, both Hurdle and zero-inflated models with or without 
overdispersion are suitable to explain the high occurrence of zero in the observed 
outcome variable. 
  
The reason behind excessive ‘zero’ observations in count data models is generally 
explained by two separate views. If we consider the averting decision-making process as 
a two-step, sequential process, the ‘hurdle’ model can better explain the decision tree and 
the outcome data. The hurdle model is “a modified count model in which the two 
processes generating the zeros and the positives (count data) are not constrained to be the 
same” (Cameron and Trivedi 1998, pp. 137). The hurdle model assumes that all zero 
observations are from one structural source. In this case, we assume that only concerned 
pastoralists (due to disease information) vaccinate livestock, and their counterparts do not 
consider vaccinating their livestock. Hence, the zero observations arise only from the 
unconcerned pastoralist. Symbolically,   
 
(3)   𝐸(𝑙𝑠𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖) = 𝑃𝑟(𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒) ∗ 0⏟             
𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
+ 𝑃𝑟(𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒) ∗ 1⏟            
𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
 
  
Letting 𝑙𝑠 be the number of vaccinated livestock by the 𝑖𝑡ℎ household where 
𝑃𝑟(𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒) presents the probability that 𝑖𝑡ℎ household will exist in the zero-
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vaccination state, and 𝑃𝑟(𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒) turns into the probability for nonzero (count)-
vaccination state. Assume that 𝑃𝑟(𝑙𝑠𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖 = 0) = 𝜑 and 𝑃𝑟(𝑙𝑠𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖 ≥ 1) =
(
1−𝜑
1−𝑒−𝜆
)(
𝜆𝑥𝑖𝑒−𝜆
𝑥𝑖!
), where 𝜆 is a truncated Poisson distribution. On the other hand, standard 
zero-inflated count data models assume that the zero observations are generated from 
both structural and sampling sources. In this context, separate examinations for true zeros 
and excess zeros are essential for predicting count observations, and to predict 
membership in the excess zero group.  
 
Zero-inflated models are generally a finite mixture model, the first part predicts 
the excess zeros in ‘always zero’ pastoralist group, and second part of which predicts the 
number of vaccinated livestock in ‘not always zero’ pastoralist group. Across the study 
area in Tanzania, we find most of the households have zero vaccinated livestock, which is 
due to the presence of both true (generated by ‘not always zero’ group of pastoralist) and 
excess zeros (generated by ‘always zero’ group of pastoralist). 
  
(4)   𝐸(𝑙𝑠𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖) = 𝑃𝑟(𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒) ∗ 0⏟             
𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜
+ 𝑃𝑟(𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒) ∗ 𝐸(𝑙𝑠 = 𝑥|𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒)⏟                        
𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜
 
 
The plausible reasons for having true zeros due to deciding not to vaccinate, are 
basically two-fold: i) either they prefer alternative uses of the infected livestock, e.g., 
eating the meat in the household, or selling the livestock to others; or ii) any other 
financial and geographical constraints limit vaccination, e.g. distance to vaccination 
services or low availability or high costs of vaccines. In some cases, both reasons may 
contribute. Therefore, we consider variants of the negative binomial model, which 
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includes Poisson, zero-inflated Poisson and zero-inflated negative binomial to correct for 
the excess zeros and over-dispersion problem simultaneously (Lambert 1992). 
 
Though the response variable (figure 1) shows a Poisson distribution with inflated 
zeros, we cannot consider the basic Poisson regression model as this model assumes 
equality between mean and variance. As the data contain significant numbers of 
households choosing not to vaccinate, comprising both true and excess zeros, some 
variant of the zero-inflated model, such as zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) and 
zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) estimation, are typically employed to correct the excess zeros 
and over-dispersion problem. All zero-inflated models consider two possible data 
generating processes. The first process with probability 𝜑𝑖 generates only zero counts, 
whereas the second process with probability 1 − 𝜑𝑖 generates positive counts from either 
a Poisson or negative binomial model. Specifically, 
𝑙𝑠𝑖~ {
𝑜 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝜑𝑖             
𝑔(𝑙𝑠𝑖|𝑥𝑖)𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 1 − 𝜑𝑖
 where the probability of 𝑔(𝑙𝑠𝑖|𝑥𝑖) is the 
following: 
 
(5)   𝑃𝑟(𝐿𝑆𝑖 = 𝑙𝑠𝑖|𝑋𝑖, 𝑍𝑖) = {
𝜑(𝛾′𝑍𝑖) + {1 − 𝜑(𝛾
′𝑍𝑖)}𝑔(0|𝑥𝑖)  𝑖𝑓 𝑙𝑠𝑖 = 0
{1 − 𝜑(𝛾′𝑍𝑖)}𝑔(𝑙𝑠𝑖|𝑥𝑖)              𝑖𝑓 𝑙𝑠𝑖 > 1
 
 
Here 𝛾 is the vector of zero-inflated coefficients to be estimated, and 𝑍𝑖
′ is the 
vector of zero-inflated covariates. Theoretically, the negative binomial (NB) incorporates 
the general Poisson model, whereas the ZINB model incorporates the ZIP model. The 
ZINB (ZIP) model consists of two separate models, a negative binomial (Poisson) model 
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to predict the count data and the logit or probit model to predict the excess zeros. Then it 
combines both models by adjusting the probabilities of count information in the Poisson 
regression for observations that are true zeros. For our purpose, a logit model is employed 
to predict pastoralists’ vaccinated livestock data for true zeros. After that, a negative 
binomial (Poisson) model is generated to predict excess zeros. 
 
Considering the descriptive features of the dataset, we estimate two different 
models and use post-estimation tests to determine which fits the data better. Significant z-
test statistics from the Vuong (1989) test reveals that either the ZINB or ZIP model 
would be preferred to the standard negative binomial model. However, a significant 
likelihood ratio test between ZINB versus ZIP models proposed by Greene (2012) reveals 
that data are over-dispersed, and that the ZIP model is more appropriate than the ZINB 
model. Finally, we compare all four estimated models, following Long and Freese 
(2014), based on AIC, BIC, and Vuong test statistics to find the preferred model(s). 
 
We consider that the vaccination decision and resulting number of vaccinated 
livestock is associated with socioeconomic variables. According to Raullt and Krebs 
(2014), a household’s vaccination decision depends on prior experiences with relevant 
outcomes, such as disease occurrence and the degree of severity. The expected cost of 
disease avoidance and preventive expenditure are other influencing factors in this 
analysis (Chilonda and Van Huylenbroeck 2001). Moreover, the decision is likely 
influenced by households’ geographical locations. Under this framework, equation (2) 
can be modeled through the following vaccination equation that describes the number of 
27 
 
vaccinated livestock equation (3), which is influenced by associated factors included in 
right-hand side: 
 
(6) 𝐷𝑣, 𝑉𝑙𝑠 = 𝑓(𝑍𝑒𝑑, 𝑍𝑐𝑐, 𝑍ℎ𝑐;  𝛽, 𝜀), 
 
where 𝑍𝑒𝑑 is the vector of disease information consisting of livestock illness and death in 
the past twelve months; 𝑍𝑐𝑐 is the vector of livestock vaccination and travel costs to 
access veterinary services; 𝑍ℎ𝑐 represents the vector of pastoral household's 
characteristics. The estimated parameters are captured by 𝛽, the vector of coefficients for 
exogenous variable 𝑥, whereas the error term, 𝜀 presents the combined effect of the 
omitted variables of the estimation model (Freedman 2005). We also include a dummy 
variable as ‘socially and economically active household’ (𝑆&𝐸_𝑑) that has been 
constructed from three other variables- household head has at least a primary school 
education level, household with at least one wage earner, and household with at least one 
cellphone. Equation (6) is the basis of our empirical estimation. Econometric estimation 
strategies, presented in chapter 4, are employed to reveal the vaccination equation to test 
and predict how socio-economic and behavioral factors affect pastoralists’ vaccination 
decisions. 
 
 
28 
 
CHAPTER 5: EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
In this chapter, we present the variables included in the maximum likelihood and mixture 
models (see Table 1), and descriptive statistics of vaccination status in terms of livestock 
illness and death. We also present and explain the econometric estimations of the 
vaccination decision model and number of vaccinated livestock model with related 
discussions followed by robustness checks. 
  
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics presented in Table 2 provide a summary overview of the livestock 
vaccination status of three ethnic groups who faced disease infection and deaths in the 
past twelve months. Even though 49.74% of households have experienced livestock 
deaths, only 10.71% vaccinated their livestock in the study areas. A higher percentage of 
the households experiencing livestock disease—compared to households not 
experiencing disease—vaccinated their livestock, which is uniform across the ethnic 
groups. The percentage of vaccination is lower, around 11% of studied households, for 
households that experienced more livestock deaths than their counterparts. We also find 
that a higher percentage of pastoralists did not vaccinate their livestock who experienced 
livestock deaths. The difference is small, but a slightly higher percentage of pastoralists 
who experienced livestock illness vaccinated their livestock than those who experienced 
livestock deaths. However, a Pearson chi-square test shows that the difference is not 
significant among the ethnic groups. The ratio of vaccinating and not-vaccinating 
households shows the same pattern for the pastoralist who experienced both livestock 
illness and death simultaneously. 
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5.2 Econometric Results 
We report the results from both maximum likelihood estimations for pastoralists’ 
averting decision and mixture models for the number of vaccinated livestock. All full 
reported models presented in this chapter include a wage earner dummy, and a socially 
and economically active household dummy to account for the extra monetary income and 
social heterogeneity in terms of livestock assets. 
 
First, we report the results of maximum likelihood estimations to check the 
factors affecting vaccination decision in table 3. Furthermore, we compute essential 
model fit indicators to compare the relative quality of all estimated models and to reveal a 
parsimonious and robust model following Long and Freese’s (2014) procedure. We find 
that the results from a penalized logit and bias corrected logit are more appropriate from 
theoretical and econometric backgrounds, although we also report standard logit and 
probit estimations for comparison. As the coefficients of maximum likelihood 
estimations are not easily explainable, we calculate the marginal effects to measure the 
instantaneous rate of change of continuous variables and discrete change of dummy 
variables, respectively. Moreover, we also compare the results of hurdle mixture models 
that predict the vaccination decision. In every case, the magnitude and level of 
significance are found to be quite similar. 
 
Table 3 and part 2 of table 4 show that the marginal effect of illness incidence on 
vaccination decision is positive and significant at the 1% level. We also find a 
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statistically significant difference in the means of the number of illness incidents between 
vaccinating (21.112) and not-vaccinating (9.382) groups of pastoralist. This result 
supports our initial conjecture and hypothesis that states that experienced livestock illness 
events influence pastoralists to decide to vaccinate their livestock. This result also 
corresponds to theoretical evidence on decision under actual risk components provided 
by Dijkhuizen et al. (1994); Fox et al. (2007), Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and 
experimental evidence cited in Chilonda and Huylenbroeck (2001). Additionally, we find 
the impact of the number of dead livestock is not statistically significant in our specified 
model, and the mean difference, reported in table 1, is also insignificant for both 
vaccinated (15.085) and not-vaccinated (10.113) groups of pastoralist. Therefore, we do 
not find support for the hypothesis that livestock deaths increase the number of livestock 
vaccinated. 
 
It is sometimes argued that monetary income such as wage earnings from family 
members positively affects the probability that households take measures to avoid risky 
events. In this study, we find that having at least one wage earner has a positive and 
significant impact on the vaccination decision. Moreover, pastoral households who are 
socially and economically active are more likely to vaccinate their livestock, which is 
significant at the 10% level. Across the study area, pastoralists who are educated, 
financially able and may have better access to information are more likely vaccinate their 
livestock. This is also consistent with empirical evidence obtained in the study by 
Covarrubias et al. (2012). 
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On the other hand, we also observe that higher per capita livestock has negative 
and significant impacts on vaccination decision at 1% level. The result simply conveys 
that pastoralist households owning a higher number of livestock per family member are 
less likely vaccinate their livestock. Though it seems counterintuitive, there are a few 
potential explanations. Pastoralists with higher livestock per capita have more options to 
either sell sick livestock in nearby markets or eat at home to minimize disease risk and 
consequent deaths. Given that livestock represent a store of wealth, it may represent a 
decreasing marginal utility of wealth. Risk attitudes may also change with wealth level, 
but in practice, eliciting risk attitude under a certain circumstances determined 
exogenously. We therefore need to make assumptions on the possibility of different risk 
attitudes of pastoralists in view of livestock diseases incidences and death. Vaccination 
cost also has a negative impact on averting decisions. When the price of a vaccine is 
higher, households are less likely to vaccinate. We also compute related model fit 
indicators for all four estimations. Finally, the predicted probabilities do not change much 
across the models. 
  
Table 4 presents the marginal effects of the mixture models in two separate but 
consecutive parts. First we consider the estimations of predicting the vaccination decision 
for hurdle models, and excess zero group of the zero inflated models. Then we consider 
the results of the model of the number of vaccinated livestock. Results reported in part 2 
of zero-inflated models determine whether the observed count is zero. It indicates that 
socially and economically active pastoralists are less likely to be in the always zero 
group. Additionally, pastoralists who experienced higher incidences of livestock illness 
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and resided comparatively far from the livestock extension offices are less likely than 
their counterparts to be in always zero group. Conversely, the higher the vaccination cost, 
the more likely the household is in excess zero group. 
 
Considering zero inflated models, we know that pastoralists who are not in the 
excess zero group, have decided to vaccinate have at least few vaccinated livestock. So, 
we compare the findings revealed from the two variants of hurdle and zero-inflated 
models that predicts the number of vaccinated livestock (see part 1 of table 4). The 
number of vaccinated livestock is influenced positively by the number of livestock 
illnesses experienced by the household in the past twelve months. This may be because 
pastoralists feel more risk of losing their livestock asset when they face frequent 
incidences of illness. Moreover, the predicted probability of vaccinated livestock is 
higher for the pastoralist who has at least one wage earner. Monetary income, especially 
from wage earners, increases the financial ability to vaccinate more livestock to cope 
with future disease risks. We further find that higher vaccination costs increase the 
number of vaccinated livestock. 
 
We also find that a few variables in the model have significantly negative impacts 
on the predicted number of vaccinated livestock. Both Poisson and negative binomial 
variants of hurdle and zero-inflated model reveal similar predictions. As per part 1 of 
table 4, household head older than 30 years have less vaccinated livestock than their 
counterparts. The estimated coefficient of the dummy variable for socially and 
economically active households is negative and significant at the 10% level. More active 
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households would have fewer vaccinated livestock compared to those who are not active. 
The most justified explanation of this finding-they know alternative options to cope or 
minimize the diseases incidences and severity. Moreover, households that experienced 
more livestock death have a significantly lower number of vaccinated livestock. In 
addition, we only find significant marginal effects in case of Poisson estimations for per 
capita livestock and travel cost dummy. However, negative binomial estimations predict 
statistically insignificant marginal effects that indicate a lower level of robustness to 
generalize the impacts of the variables in determining the number of vaccinated livestock.  
 
5.3 Robustness Check 
In both discrete choice and count data models, estimations related to livestock deaths are 
not significant, and vaccination cost contradicts the predictions of conventional theories. 
Moreover, few marginal effects of both components of mixture models show same 
direction which is opposite in general. All these queries require further investigation 
through several robustness checks. 
 
As a part of post-estimation robustness checks, we estimate both models under 
different specification that includes the set of covariates regarding households’ prior 
disease experience, vaccination and travel cost, and household characteristics 
successively to check the consistency. Following Barslund (2007), we consider disease 
information as a set of core variables, and others as the set of non-core covariates. In 
every step, we find consistent results with a few exceptions. Further, we also estimated 
other variants of the hurdle model, reported in Table 4 including Poisson-bias corrected 
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logit, Poisson-penalized logit, negative binomial-bias corrected logit, and the negative 
binomial-penalized logit due to the presence of excessive zeros. We also calculate the 
predicted probabilities of all estimated models that do not meaningfully change. 
Moreover, we run regressions on data that pool data for the three ethnic groups together. 
In most cases, we find similar results in terms of relationship, magnitude and significance 
level for every alternative data specifications, except for the Barabaig ethnic group. We, 
then, perform Hausman (1978) specification test by controlling ex-post disease 
information, cost lines, and household’s characteristics to check the consistency and 
conditional heterogeneity. We additionally compute all models with robust standard 
errors to reduce any heteroskedasticity incidence following Cameron and Trivedi (2009). 
These estimations confirm the robustness of main results in table 2, 3 and 4. The detail 
results are not reported in the main text, but codes are available in respective Stata do-
file. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Vaccination is a key tool for livestock disease risk management (Keeling et al. 2003), but 
little is known about what factors drive pastoralists’ vaccination choices. This study 
contributes to the existing literature in several ways. We used primary data generated 
from surveys with pastoralists in the Iringa region of Tanzania, and analyzed household-
level as well as community-level information to address two of our general research 
questions on the factors influencing the vaccination decision. We employed multiple 
empirical procedures to explore the robustness of pastoralists’ vaccination decisions and 
number of vaccinated livestock given livestock diseases and deaths experienced in the 
last twelve months and other economic, social and behavioral variables.  
 
We find that pastoralist households that are socially and economically active and 
have at least one wage earner are more likely to decide to vaccinate their livestock. 
Moreover, the occurrence of livestock illness also has a significant positive impact on 
averting decision. We also find consistent results from a few variants of mixture models, 
for example hurdle and zero-inflated models where the same set of variables predicts that 
pastoralists are less likely to be in the excess zero class. We further find that a high 
prevalence of livestock illness, higher vaccination cost, and wage earners in the 
household are positively related to the number of vaccinated livestock. On the contrary, 
higher numbers of dead livestock due to diseases, high travel cost in terms of distance 
from extension offices, and households with older heads of household have significantly 
lower number of vaccinated livestock. 
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Finally, we propose a few lessons relevant to policy based on our findings. First, 
lowering the cost of vaccination would likely increase pastoralist’s vaccination decision. 
As proposed by McLeod and Rushton (2007), a vaccination support program would be 
helpful for low-income pastoralists. Second, government and NGOs can invest in 
frequent and extensive livestock health education and management, training, and 
infrastructure, which would be beneficial for both pastoralist households and extension 
officers (Allport et al. 2005; Perry et al. 2013). Though pastoralists have traditional 
knowledge, training on emerging diseases and treatments should positively influence 
vaccination uptake. Third, infrastructure development for vaccination support programs 
and convenient delivery systems are essential to help low-income pastoralists (Mazet et 
al. 2009). Currently there are no commercial veterinarians or dispensaries operating in 
many rural parts of Tanzania, even though the Tanzanian government intended to phase 
out government veterinary services (except in the case of public goods) in favor of 
private practices over a decade ago (Gustafson et al. 2015). Fourth, convenient access to 
information (e.g., veterinary services, market price) through mobile phones would 
increase the awareness of disease, treatment options, and vaccination decisions. In this 
respect, Wolf (2005) suggests the same. 
 
Our study considers static-type models based on cross-sectional data. We are 
therefore unable to provide dynamic explanations of the decision-making process of 
pastoralists on livestock assets and disease risk management, where an appropriate panel 
study can reveal time-dependent changes. Moreover, this exercise does not capture 
spatial elements that may be relevant. Future research can address these shortcomings. 
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Figure 1. Distribution of Vaccinated Livestock 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Map of the Study Area
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Appendices 
Table 1. Description of Model Variables 
 
Variable Description Livestock vaccination status 
Vaccinated 
?̅?(𝑠𝑑) 
Not vaccinated 
?̅?(𝑠𝑑) 
Pooled 
?̅?(𝑠𝑑) 
Dependent variables 
𝑣𝑎𝑐_𝑙𝑠_𝑑 Indicator variable of livestock vaccination status (1 if vaccinated, 0 if 
not) 
- - 0.107(0.310) 
𝑣𝑎𝑐_𝑙𝑠 Number of vaccinated livestock (in TLU) in the past 12 months 162.933***(437.377) 0.000(0.000) 17.457(148.906) 
     
Ex-post diseases information    
𝑖𝑙𝑙_𝑙𝑠 Number of livestock’s ill incidence in the past 12 months 21.111***(44.488) 9.382(9.208) 10.639(17.084) 
𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑑_𝑙𝑠 Number of died livestock (in TLU) in the past 12 months  15.085(29.669) 10.113(14.440) 10.645(16.695) 
𝑝𝑐𝑙𝑠 Per capita livestock (in TLU) 14.284***(47.906) 4.251(5.087) 5.326(16.376) 
     
Costs of vaccination    
𝑣𝑎𝑐_𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 Vaccination cost (in TZS) for infected livestock 3.97e+7(2.02e+7) 1.61e+7(1.2e+6) 1.86e+7(3.46e+7) 
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙_𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑑 Indicator variable of travel cost of vaccination (1 if distance is medium 
to high, 0 if none to low) 
3.333*(0.967) 2.823(1.138) 2.878(1.130) 
     
Household characteristics    
𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝_𝑑 Indicator variable of household (HH) head’s age (1 if HH head’s age 
more than 30 years, 0 if unknown and less than 30) 
0.810(0.402) 0.777(0.417) 0.781(0.415) 
𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑑 Indicator variable of household’s wage earners (1 if HH has at least one 
wage earner, 0 if not) 
0.190**(0.402) 0.051(0.222) 0.066(0.249) 
𝑆&𝐸_𝑑 Indicator variable of socially and economically active household (1 if 
primary educated HH head with at least one cellphone has extra 
earnings from different sources like wage labor, remittance, selling 
cultural goods,  0 otherwise) 
0.190**(0.402) 0.057(0.233) 0.071(0.258) 
Notes: ***, ** and * represents the level of significant at 1%, 5% and 10% of the t-test for equality of means of the vaccinated and non-
vaccinated pastoralist household. 
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Table 2. Ex-post Livestock Diseases and Vaccination Status 
 
Ethnic 
group 
Livestock’s illness incidence Pearson 
χ2 
(p-value) 
Livestock’s death Pearson 
χ2 
(p-value) 
Experienced Not experienced Experienced Not experienced 
Vaccinate Not 
vaccinated 
Vaccinate Not 
vaccinated 
Vaccinate Not 
vaccinated 
Vaccinate Not 
vaccinated 
Barabaig 6.00 
(18.60) 
35.00 
(81.40) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
1.00 
(100.00) 
0.227 
(0.633) 
5.00 
(23.81) 
16.00 
(76.19) 
3.00 
(13.04) 
20.00 
(86.96) 
0.855 
(0.355) 
Massai 12.00 
(9.92) 
109.00 
(90.08) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
1.00 
(100.00) 
0.110 
(0.740) 
6.00 
(10.00) 
54.00 
(90.00) 
6.00 
(9.68) 
56.00 
(90.32) 
0.004 
(0.952) 
Sukuma 1.00 
(3.33) 
29.00 
(96.67) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
- 0.00 
(0.00) 
17.00 
(100.00) 
1.00 
(7.69) 
12.00 
(92.31) 
1.353 
(0.245) 
Total 21.00 
(10.82) 
173.00 
(89.18) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
2.00 
(100.00) 
0.243 
(0.622) 
11.00 
(10.20) 
87.00 
(88.78) 
10.00 
(10.20) 
88.00 
(89.90) 
0.053 
(0.817) 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are percentage of household. 
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Table 3. Marginal Effects of Maximum Likelihood Estimations for Pastoralists’ Averting Decisions 
  
Notes: ‘dy/dx’ and ‘se’ indicates marginal effect after regression and standard error, respectively. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001. 
Variable Logit Probit Bias Corrected 
Logit 
Penalized 
Logit 
dy/dx (se) dy/dx(se) dy/dx(se) dy/dx(se) 
Illness incidence 0.007**(0.003) 0.007**(0.003) 0.069(0.045) 0.079**(0.035) 
Dead livestock (in TLU) 0.001(0.001) 0.001(0.001) 0.007(0.010) 0.010(0.011) 
Per capita livestock -0.002(0.004) -0.002(0.006) -0.216***(0.039) -0.044*(0.027) 
Vaccination cost (in TZS) 0.058* (0.033) -0.066*(0.040) -0.138(0.409) -0.705*(0.397) 
Travel cost dummy 0.080*(0.044) 0.082*(0.047) 0.887(0.635) 0.957(0.631) 
Age group dummy 0.042(0.047) 0.050(0.053) 0.391(0.602) 0.465(0.622) 
Wage earner dummy  0.110**(0.052) 0.129**(0.063) 1.449**(0.643) 1.495**(0.656) 
S&E active HH dummy 0.105**(0.052) 0.127**(0.063) 1.407**(0.637) 1.450**(0.666) 
     
Log likelihood -55.349 -55.363 - -38.972 
LR 𝜒2 22.55 22.52 - - 
Wald 𝜒2 - - - 19.78 (0.011) 
Pseudo 𝑅2(p>𝜒2) 0.169(0.004) 0.169(0.004) - - 
Sample size 195 195 195 195 
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Table 4. Marginal Effects of Mixture Models for No. of Vaccinated Livestock by Pastoralist 
Variable Poisson-Logit 
Hurdle 
(PLH) 
Negative Binomial- 
Logit Hurdle 
(NBH) 
Zero-Inflated 
Negative 
Binomial (ZINB) 
Zero-Inflated 
Poisson 
(ZIP) 
dy/dx (se) dy/dx (se) dy/dx (se) dy/dx (se) 
Part 2: Predicting number of vaccinated livestock (count data)  
Illness incidence 0.011**(0.005) 0.014(.011) 0.014(0.011) 0.011**(0.011) 
Dead livestock (in TLU) -0.010***(0.001) -0.009***(0.003) -0.009**(0.003) -0.010***(0.001) 
Per capita livestock -0.002***(0.003) -0.003(0.008) -0.003(0.008) -0.002(0.003) 
Vaccination cost (in TZS) 0.711***(0.094) 0.622***(0.159) 0.621***(0.159) 0.711***(0.094) 
Travel cost dummy -0.327***(0.136) -0.285(0.240) -0.285(0.240) -0.327***(0.136) 
Age group dummy -0.923***(0.075) -0.976(0.216) -0.976***(0.216) -0.923***(0.075) 
Wage earner dummy 0.724***(0.080) 0.640***(0.203) 0.639**(0.203) 0.724***(0.080) 
S&E active HH dummy -0.302***(0.109) -0.225***(0.230) -0.224(0.229) -0.301***(0.109) 
  
Part 1: Predicting vaccination decision (for PLH, NBH) and excess zeros (for ZIP, ZINB)  
Illness incidence 0.086**(0.039) 0.085**(0.039) -0.086**(0.039) -0.086**(0.039) 
Dead livestock (in TLU) 0.013(0.012) 0.013(0.013) -0.013(0.013) -0.013(0.012) 
Per capita livestock -0.029(0.058) -0.029(0.058) 0.029(0.058) 0.029(0.058) 
Vaccination cost (in TZS) -0.814*(0.445) -0.814*(0.445) 0.814*(0.445) 0.815***(0.445) 
Travel cost dummy 1.131*(0.683) 1.131*(0.683) -1.131*(0.683) -1.131***(0.683) 
Age group dummy 0.591(0.669) 0.591(0.669) -0.591(-0.669) -0.591(0.669) 
Wage earner dummy 1.561**(0.708) 1.561**(0.708) -1.561**(0.708) -1.561**(0.708) 
S&E active HH dummy 1.490**(0.709) 1.490**(0.709) -1.491**(0.709) -1.491**(0.709) 
     
/lnalpha - -2.512***(0.570) -2.513***(0.570) - 
alpha -  0.081(0.046) - 
Nonzero observations 21  21 21 
Log likelihood -142.997 -141.430 -141.437 -143.005 
LR 𝜒2 -  64.760 10038.470(0.000) 
Wald 𝜒2 16.200 (0.0400) 16.200(0.400) - - 
LR Test (𝜒2̅̅ ̅) -  3.140(0.038) - 
𝑧(𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙) of Voung Test -  3.540(0.000) 4.410(0.000) 
Sample size 195 195 195 195 
Notes: ‘dy/dx’ and ‘se’ indicates marginal effect after regression and standard error, respectively. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001. 
